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Abstract
;. Current thought is that the most appropriate method for determining
the value of life or of reduced risk of injury is through estimation of
a revealed market value individuals place on risk. That theory assumes
that risk is transacted in the market in the form of wage premiums
workers receive for engaging in higher risk jobs. Hedonic price esti-
mation techniques have been used to estimate that premium. We argue in
this paper that the value of life derived from estimates of wage-risk
premiums are biased upward because they fail to account for various
forms of insurance. Taking into account only one such form of insurance,
workmen's compensation, leads to reductions in estimates of value of
life of from 23 to 27 percent.
ic
WAGE-RISK PREMIUMS AND WORKMEN'S CC»1PENSATI0N
I. Introduction
Thaler and Rosen were the first to apply hedonic price estimation
techniques to the problem of estimating the value of risk [7]. That ef-
fort was the first major breakthrough in the determination of value of
life since the development of the traditional methods of estimating the
discounted stream of future earnings foregone or the discounted value
of the net of earnings over consumption because of death or injury. The
Thaler-Rosen method assumes that risk can be transacted in the market;
the price at which a unit of risk is sold is the wage premium an indi-
vidual would be willing to forego to engage in an occupation in which
the probability of death or severe injury was reduced by some measurable
amount. Also, their method assumes that the value of risk reduction is
transferable across experiences.
More specifically, the value of numerous aspects of a job are em-
bedded in the wage rate. One of those dimensions is job related risk.
Assume all dimensions are in equilibrium except risk. Then if workers
have different attitudes toward risk, a series of indifference curves
are generated, the envelope of which defines the minimum trade-off of
an individual with certain preferences between risk and wages. In fact,
the values on the envelope curve could be thought of as the compensation
that must be paid to the marginal worker to get him or her to accept a
job with that risk level.
Similarly, for firms there exists a willingness to pay for risk.
Again assume that all job characteristics other than risk are in equi-
librium. The willingness of a firm to trade risk for profits defines
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an isoprofit function for that firm. This may be thought of as the
firm's willingness to invest in safety, i.e., items that will reduce
the probability of injury or death. The profit maximizing firm will
not invest in safety unless each dollar invested results in a direct re-
duction in wages, thereby providing the ability to measure the wage-risk
tradeoff on the firm's isoquants. The isoquants differ among firms due
to different safety production functions across industries. The enve-
lope curve of the isoquants reflects the market offer curve.
Appropriate concavity conditions for the isoquants and convexity
conditions for the indifference curves will guarantee the existence of
a unique set of tangencies. The locus of those tangencies between con-
sumers' indifference curves and producers isoquants are the observed
phenomena that have been estimated in a nimber of studies. The value
of the risk coefficient, which measures, e.g., the amount of wages will-
ingly foregone to reduce the risk of death or injury by 1 chance in
10,000, can be extrapolated to determine the implied value of life.
Various studies using differing samples, risk estimates, and occupa-
tional mixes have provided estimates in two rather distinct ranges [5].
The previous estimates of the value of life or injury explicitly
ignore various forms of insurance, including workmen's compensation,
that should have the effect of reducing the wage compensation necessary
to induce an individual to enter a risky occupation [1] . Thus these
studies have overestimated the true market value placed on risk. In
this paper we provide a theoretical basis for the inclusion of insurance
in the estimation of risk premiums and then estimate the effect of one
fom of insurance, namely v.'orkmen's compensation, on those premiums.^
-3-
II. Model of Worker Choice
Assume there are two possible states of the world, injury and no
injury. The worker's utility from the composite good X is contingent
on the prevailing state of the world. Other things equal, the worker
prefers the state of no injury, i.e., U(X) > B(X) for any given X, where
the utility function is U in the no injury state and B in the injury
state. Each utility function exhibits diminishing marginal utility
(U", B" < 0).
The composite good may be purchased with income earned from work-
ing, W(p), where p is the probability of injury associated with each
job. A unique W(p) locus of market opportunities for each worker is de-
termined by the worker's productivity, attitude toward injury, and the
firm's technological ability to reduce risk. The W(p) function is a
generalization of Adam Smith's equalizing differences concept. It is
an equilibrating device for matching worker preferences over risk and
income with employers' willingness to compensate workers for taking risk.
Now introduce into the system insurance in the form of workmen's
compensation that is designed to provide recovery of a statutorily de-
termined percentage, s, of income lost due to job related injuries. In-
come that may be spent on the composite good if injury occurs is sW(p).
For convenience, define the price of the composite good X to be unity.
The worker chooses the p* (and thus a job-risk combination) that maxi-
mizes expected utility G where:
G = (l-p)U(W(p)) + pB(sW(p)).
The necessary condition for G to be icaximized is:
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(1) G = (l-p)U'W' + pB'sW - U + B = 0.
Solving for W (p*) yields
W' (P*^ = (l-p*)u'Vp*sB' •
Consumers choose a job so that the ratio of the marginal utilities in
the two states of nature are proportional to the wage premium. If util-
ity is higher in the state of no injury than in the state of injury,
W (p*) > and firms must offer higher wages to entice workers to accept
more risky jobs. This conclusion holds for risk averse, risk neutral,
and risk loving workers alike.
The effect that workmen's compensation has on the observed market
determined risk premium W' (p) can be determined by implicit differentia-
tion of (1). This yields:
3p*
_
-(l+p)B'W'(p) ^ .
3s ~ G "
•
PP
Thus introducing, or more explicitly, increasing the percentage of mar-
ket earnings that workmen's compensation payments will recoup in case
of injury will induce the worker to accept a job that has attached to
it a higher risk of injury. We know that a worker who prefers not to
be injured (U > B) must be compensated with a higher wage to accept a
job with a higher p. However, it remains to be determined how the risk
premium is affected by increased insurance coverage in the form of work-
men's compensation payments.
If W(p) is concave, VJ''(p) < and --£— > imply that the wage pre-
mium W'(p) declines as workmen's compensation increases. The increased
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vrorkmen's compensation raises the level of utility in the event of in-
jury. Thus the gap between the utility levels in the separate states
of the world is narrowed. The unfortunate event of injury is less
"painful", so more risk (and higher income) is now consistent with the
same preference function.
But W(p) is a market equilibrium locus of tangencles of worker in-
difference curves and firm isoprofit job offer curves. Economic ratio-
nale does not necessarily require W" (p) < 0, and the concavity of W(p)
3
is not a necessary condition for the uniqueness of p*. Thus we cannot
unambiguously predict that the wage-risk premium will decline with
higher workmen's compensation payments.
However, the model clearly predicts that workers will accept risk-
ier and higher paying jobs with increased workmen's compensation pay-
ments, i.e., -r^— > 0. Actual expected workmen's compensation payments
are positively correlated with this increased risk for two reasons
:
(1) the probability of injury and therefore, of payment is higher; and
(2) wages, on which workmen's compensation payments are based, are high-
er for riskier jobs. Thus, models of the wage-risk market equilibrium
that ignore the impact of insurance or workmen's compensation payments
omit an important part of the worker's risk premium calculus. Further-
more, econometric estimates of the risk-compensating wage premium are
biased upward if workmen's compensation payments are positively corre-
lated with the independent variable of most interest, risk.
III. An Estimate of the Impact of Workmen's Compensation Paj^ents On
Wage-Risk Premiums
Recall that the W(p) locus of job opportunities available to each
worker is dependent on the worker's productive capacity. Thus human
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capital and/or socioeconomic variables are required for an accurate
specification of any market wage equation. That is to say, W(p,c) must
be estimated, where c is a vector of worker and job characteristics.
Thaler-Rosen provided a basis for incorporating these variables in a
hedonlc estimation of wages, thus defining an appropriate method for em-
pirically estimating the value of reducing the risk of death or injury.
Apparently because of multicollinearity, they ignored the interaction
of risk and socioeconomic variables on job risk premiums. We contend
that these interactions are crucial to a correct specification of the
W(p,c) function, because they represent differences in the locus of op-
portunities available to workers due to differential abilities to work
in risky situations and self-selection biases that Influence individuals'
willingness to work in risky situations. The principle components tech-
nique is employed in this study to obviate the problems of multicollin-
earity inherent in such variables [3, pp. 143-4].
In addition, the model is specified in a manner that measures the
impact of workmen's compensation pajnnents on the observed risk-
compensating wage premium. To do this we estimated the equation in
three forms, two with workmen's compensation payments included and one
without. Equation 1, in which workmen's compensation is excluded, was
estimated to provide comparability to the Thaler-Rosen estimates. The
theory does not result in an exact prediction of the appropriate speci-
fication of the equation when workmen's compensation is included.
Therefore, two specifications are used. Equation 2 redefines the depen-
dent variable to be the expected wage, [(l-p)W + psW] . The third equa-
tion uses the absolute value of the difference between wages and ccmpen-
satable losses if an injury should occur, W - sW. The extremely high
-7-
correlation between weekly wage, W, and the workmen's compensation vari-
able, s, W (s, is the effective rate of compensation for salary lost in
K K.
the event of injury in the k-th state), precluded simply adding s,W as
an explanatory variable on the RHS because this led to the swamping of
all other explanatory influences. Thus we regressed W - s, W on the
listed explanatory variables as a way of incorporating the effect of
workmen's compensation in equation 3. This procedure is econometrically
equivalent to assuming the coefficient of s, W to be +1 if left on the
RHS. It is well known that this procedure leads to unbiased estimates
of the other coefficients. Since it is one of these other coefficients,
specifically, the coefficient on our risk factor, that we are concerned
with, this procedure allows us to estimate the effect of workmen's com-
pensation on wage-risk premiums, our sole intent. Since the estimated
coefficients are unbiased in the workmen's compensation equation, they
are subject to the standard interpretations.
The measure of wages (V/) used is the average weekly wage of indi-
viduals in a selected group of occupations, the wages taken from the
public use samples of the 1970 Census of Population, 1/10,000 sample [8],
The measure of risk (p) used is identical to that used by Thaler-
Rosen. It is the actuarial risk of death by occupation class provided
by the Society of Actuarials [6]. We assume that the probability of
serious injury is proportional to the probability of death and that the
probabilities are not cumulative.
The effective rate of salary regained or other benefits payable
from workmen' s compensation (s) was taken from the Compendium on
Workmen's Compensation [4], The variable, as calculated by Rosenblun
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varies across states and adjusts for various payment techniques, e.g.,
delay time before a worker is eligible for compensation. Other demo-
graphic variables include unemployment rates (UNEMP) . This variable
was not considered by Thaler-Rosen. However, it should be expected, a
priori, that workers will get less disutility from taking on riskier
jobs when alternatives are limited by unemplo3ment . We measured unem-
ployment by the percent of the labor force unemployed in the nearest
city for which BLS statistics exist.
Thaler-Rosen found union membership to be highly correlated with
wage premiums. Presumably, union education programs provide workers
with better information about the risk of injury or death related to
different occupations. UNION was measured as the percent of each occu-
pational group unionized by industry.
Demographic and personal characteristic variables included are
whether or not the worker lives in an SMSA (URBAl'T) , age (AGE), race
(TffllTE), marital status (MARR) , education (years of schooling (EDUC)),
whether or not the worker is the head of a family (FH) , i.e., the major
breadwinner, whether or not the individual held a full time job (FT),
and finally, whether the occupation could be classified as operative
(OP), service (S), or general labor (GL) . The variables that identify
factors about the individual (age, education, race, marital status, and
family head) were introduced to measure differences in attitudes toward
risk across workers. The job characteristics were introduced to further
isolate factors that might lead individuals to undertake jobs that en-
counter higher risks with a lower compensating risk premium, i.e., the
self selection problem. Data for these variables were taken from the
1970 Census of Population [8].
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The method of principle components was used to correct for multi-
collinearity. Specifically, three factors with eigen values greater
than one were found among the linear estimates of the socioeconomic
variables that made up the principle components. Those are labeled
SEFl, SEF2, and SEF3. Principle component analysis also was applied to
the risk and risk interaction terms. That produced one factor with an
eigen value greater than one, labeled RF. Ordinary least squares was
then used to estimate the following three equations:
(1) W = aRF + bUNEMP + cUNION + dURBAN + eNE + f SOUTH + gWEST + SEFl
+ SEF2 + SEF3 + u
(2) (l-p)W + psW = aRF + bUNEMP + cUNION + dURBM + eNE + fSOUTH
+ gWEST + SEFl + SEF2 + SEF3 + u
(3) W - sW = aRF + bUNEMP + cUNION + dURBM + eNE + fSOUTH + gWEST
+ SEFl + SEF2 + SEF3 + u
Region dummies, NE, SOUTH, and WEST were added as suggested by Thaler-
Rosen.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 1. Our interest
centers around the coefficient estimated for the risk variable, RF. RF
is estimated as:
RF = a p + a (p«AGE) + a^Cp -MARRIED) + a^(p-AGE) + a^Cp -UNION)
where the a., i = 1,...5, are the factor scores from the principle com-
ponents procedure. Following the procedure outlined by Thaler-Rosen,
the estimated value of a 0.001 increase in risk amounts to $163 per year.
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Extrapolating again In the manner of Thaler-Rosen, the value of reducing
8 ,3w ,„ ,„-2
risk to zero is $162,575. (-1^ x 50 x 10 = a(a, + a^AGE + a^MARRIED
op 12 3
+ a, •WHITE + a^UNION) x 50 x 10) This estimate is very similar to that
of Thaler-Rosen. A similar procedure applied to the risk coefficients
estimated in equations 2 and 3 provide estimated values of life of
$117,574 and $125,378, respectively. These estimates reflect declines
in the estimated value of life of 27 and 23 percent, respectively. Thus,
empirical estimates of the risk compensating wage premium that ignore
the effects of insurance schemes may substantially overestimate the
value of life.
Conclusion
We have shown that an attempt to adjust for insurance substantially
reduces estimates of value of life. This finding is consistent with the
suggestions of Bailey [1]. The results of our empirical analysis should
only partially account for the full influence of insurance because only
one of many existing forms of insurance is estimated. Therefore, fur-
ther analysis of market determined estimates of value of life should ex-
tend our analysis to other forms of insurance.
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Footnotes
The model relies on the work by Ehrlich and Becker [2],
2
The second order condition is
G = 2W«(sB' - U) + (l-p)«U"'(W')^ + pB"«(sW')^
+ W"-((l-p)U' + psB') < 0.
The p* which satisfies equation (1) is unique only if G < holds.
^If Gpp < then ^r < {^^-^.jji^j_p.}{2W.(U'-sB')
- (l-p)U"[W']^ - pB"[sW']^.
Clearly this permits but does not require W" < 0.
4With the risk-socioeconomic interactions included, the standard
errors of all risk related variables increased dramatically. Risk by
itself, however, was no longer significantly related to the dependent
variable, the weekly wage rate [7, Table 3, pp. 291-2].
Thaler-Rosen were able to identify whether or not each worker in
their sample belonged to a union. Those data were not available to us.
Therefore, we use percentage of each occupational group unionized by in-
dustry. Not surprisingly, due to the large sample sizes of the two
studies, the means do not differ substantially.
Those principle components include age, race, education, family
head, full time, operative, service, and labor.
The factor scores and mean values of the variables are:
a^ = .431 AGE = 39.77
a^ = .008 MARRIED = .994
a, = .348 WHITE = .8646
a, = .363 UinON = 52.254
4
a^ = .005
g
Undoubtedly, this linear extrapolation underestimates the true
value of life. All occupations for which data are available provide a
narrow range of risk levels concentrated at the lower end of the scale.
Therefore, it has been impossible in this and other studies to find
meaningful non-linear estimates of the risk-v/age trade-off.
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Table 1
Regression Estimates of Wage-Risk Premiums
(Standard Errors are in parentheses)
Dependent Variable (1)
W
(2)
(l-p)W + psW
(3)
W-sW
Independent Variables
RF 193.03
(134.67)
140.78
(102.70)
148.86
(79.55)
UNEMPLOYMENT -1.92
(2.7)
-1.88
(2.68)
-3.71
(1.6)
UNION 0.55
(0.07)
0.55
(0.06)
0.32
(0.04)
URBAN -17.37
(5.76)
-17.22
(5.72)
-8.04
(3.4)
NE -18.89
(4.91)
-18.73
(4.87)
-11.06
(2.9)
SOUTH -34.58
(5.38)
-34.47
(5.33)
-7.89
(3.18)
WEST 6.00
(6.24)
6.02
(6.19)
4.46
(3.69)
SEFl 1227.57
(127.89)
1227.45
(126.99)
689.76
(75.54)
SEF2 170.58
(128.02)
167.19
(127.40)
149.96
(75.62)
SEF3 227.40
(118.24)
281.58
(117.40)
169.24
(69.84)
Intercept 117.14
(12.51)
116.80
(12.42)
68.23
(7.39)
DF 2242 2242 2242
F 33.2 33.35 28.41
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